The Woodward Review: A Creative and
Critical Journal
Volume 1
Issue 2 Reviews & Responses

Article 5

2022

Can you feel my heart beat so? I can't let it go: lyric, repetition, and
the poematic subject in question
Ezekiel Tsieh

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/woodwardreview
Part of the Nonfiction Commons

Recommended Citation
Tsieh, Ezekiel (2022) "Can you feel my heart beat so? I can't let it go: lyric, repetition, and the poematic
subject in question," The Woodward Review: A Creative and Critical Journal: Vol. 1: Iss. 2, Article 5.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/woodwardreview/vol1/iss2/5

This Reviews and Responses is brought to you for free and open access by the Open Access Journals at
DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Woodward Review: A Creative and Critical
Journal by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@WayneState.

56

Ezekiel Tsieh
responding to the lyric in

Woodward Review 1

Can you feel my heart beat so? I can't let it go:
Lyric, repetition, and the poematic subject in
question
Heard it all before; I want my money back!
— Bowling for Soup, "High School Never Ends"
Do I contradict myself? / Very well then I contradict myself, / (I
am large, I contain multitudes)
— Walt Whitman, Song of Myself.
Genres are not to be mixed. I will not mix genres. I repeat: genres
are not to be mixed. I will not mix them.
— Jacques Derrida
It [a deciphering practice] proposes that the way we "normally" feel
about Self, Other, and World should not be taken as any index of
the "justness" or legitimacy of the ratios of distribution of power,
privilege, and role allocation...
— Sylvia Wynter, "Rethinking Aesthetics: Notes Towards
a Deciphering Practice."
_____________
This isn't the first essay I pitched. It’s not the second one, which
ought to have been submitted by the deadline which, at the time of
writing, was two days ago. Rather, this is the third time I am trying
to write this essay, having let a little loose on explaining myself
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completely or concisely. But there is a point I would like to drive
home that has run throughout every variation:
Poetry, and specifically the poetry we've decided to call
"lyric poetry" today, is defined by two primary characteristics. First,
that the poetic is not just an “event”, “experience,” or “encounter,”
but that the subjectivity of the poem itself it structured by a
paradoxical and unresolvable tension between poematic desire for
singular totality and the impossibility to answer such a call in the
poetic act. Second, that the work of interpretation which both
constitutes the encounter and its aftermath—or, reading, as we are
used to calling it in contemporary criticism—contributes an equal
share as the poem itself to this particular subjectivity (Derrida, Che
cos'è la poesia?). And while it is the case that the above has been well
rehearsed by other readers of Derrida, this essay does not seek to be
a dress rehearsal; my point in this essay is somewhat ajar. For if the
poem is defined by this elusive subjectivity that at once is and is not
(by virtue of its own impossibility), we must beg the question:
Is there a subject in a poem?
I do not have the time—and this venue is not the outlet—
to putter around psychoanalytic theory in search of a case for
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subjectivity on which to rest an answer. Suffice it to say, for present
purposes at least, any answer will be deconstructive and therefore
somewhat unsatisfying and unpalatable: Yes, because no; and viceversa. Just so we're clear here: I'm not talking about the speaker of the
poem, per se, but the question of whether subjectivity requires a
subject at all, or if the poem—understood as event, encounter, and
experience—can serve or operate as a subject in its own right (one
might further ask, Turing-test style, if simulating a subjectivity is the
same as having one).
There’s some critical consensus that acknowledges one of
the prerequisites for subjectivity is a subject and therefore little time
is spent establishing what a subject is, or otherwise avoiding detail
on the matter, or that the subject, qua the French, is dead. Yet
subjectivity persists, and how could it not when defined precisely by
the impossibility to meet d/Desire? To put the question another
way, in a deliberate reversal of how it has been commonly phrased:
Who or what is addressing me in or from the poem?; Who or what
is performing the poem’s dictated enunciations, and how am I
supposed to receive them?; Does a poem need a subject?
This last is another way of asking: Does poetry need critics?
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The trick of the (lyric) poem is that it does not belong to
any genre, not even to a genre called “lyric.” This sleight of hand lies
not just in the acts of writing, reading, and interpretation, but in the
way it relies on what is already familiar, already at-hand, and alreadyready: the poem does not make itself available to its audience, but was
available before it had arranged itself into itself. The lyric creates a
tautology of language that is both impenetrable and impossible from
which to escape. It does so by way of repetition in a Deleuzean sense,
in which the repetition of an event (the poem) is necessarily already
differentiated or otherwise dislocated and displaced from its origin(al).
This is precisely what allows for “theories of reading,” which is the
term literary critics have embarrassingly coined either out of a
genuine earnestness to expand definitions of the literary or for the
vain veneer of colloquialism. Perhaps both. Whichever it is, the
poem (and therefore its poematic) relies on and necessitates at-hand
sensory and affective clichés, and... I'm kind of tired of it. 6
A poem has a subject not because the subject is a prerequisite
of subjectivity, but only because poematic subjectivity throws a

Before I'm accused of being a crank or a hater (which, to be fair, I am both), my
discomfiture with these clichés is not that they are ineffectual or otherwise
dysfunctional; in fact quite the opposite. The lyric works. I relate to it; I feel it.
6
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subject into the world. This poematic subjectivity is not inherent to
the poem itself, or to be more precise, is invisible to our senses and
to our aesthetic expressions. Rather, poematic subjectivity here ought
to be understood as the process by which the subject of the poem
emerges (or, at least, the illusion of one, such that a poem might be
addressed). In this way, poematic subjectivity is the result of the
encounter between critic and poem and renders itself distinct from
subjectivity as such. The poem itself cannot be the subject, for the
poem—inasmuch as it is an event, encounter, experience—cannot
in itself have d/Desire (and therefore does not meet the standard of
the poematic, which I would argue does). There exists a backwardslooking movement that has gone acknowledged but uninterrogated
in contemporary theories of poetry and particularly of lyric (Jonathan
Culler's recent Theory of the Lyric, for example, admits itself to be
much more of a general outline of a theory than theory in and of
itself).7 This backwards-looking movement can be found in Derrida's
mentions of the double-movement of the poematic function, and is
supported through what he calls apprendre par cours.8 Derrida's pun

Culler, Jonathan. Theory of the Lyric. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015.
For a quick glance at what I mean by this, I am deriving it from Jacques Derrida
by way of Timothy Clark's essay, "By Heart: A Reading of Derrida's 'Che cos'è la
poesia?' through Keats and Celan," 1993. Oxford Literary Review.
7
8
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here is on par cours, where to learn (or, in this case, "apprehend") is
also to go “by/on [a] journey.”9 It puns on the French couer, meaning
“heart,” hence making it an obtusely triangulated pun between
French and English. Derrida instructs that a poem is something one
desires to learn “by heart” (for which we can substitute “rote,” at
least for the purposes of this essay), and learning both as a journey
and being on one. 10
Event, encounter, and experience do not collapse into each
other so much as they are each mutually constitutive of the other
two, so much so that the three separate terms themselves, though
they signify—that is, describe—different affective (and even or
interpretive) states in the acts of reading, writing, and interpretation,
they do not imminently or inevitably conjure a subject even as they
might operate in similar and simultaneous manners.
Yet this poematic subjectivity, because it is conjured without
subject but not without referent (that is to say, without cliché), is half
of the double-bind that is expressed in the linguistic tautology of the

Derrida, Jacques. "Che cos'è la poesia?" Points... Interviews 1974-1994. Trans.
Peggy Kamuf. Ed. Elizabeth Weber. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995.
10 Ibid.
9
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poem. 11 As both precondition and “post-condition” of the poem (I
hesitate on words like “aftermath/afterlife” or “residue”), it conjures
a subjectivity that is not so much obscured or obfuscated from us
despite its tautology, but rather escapes prosaic language altogether
to arrange words in a different system of meaning, i.e. a different
language. This is, however, about as far as a poem is able to go. The
work of subjectivity—which includes the work of creating a subject
—lies precisely in the encounter: when the critic calculates that their
attempt at interpretation is a worthy risk to violate or otherwise
intrude upon the poem's subjectivity by attempting to decipher its
meaning for a politics of the here-and-now.
Hence the problem with contemporary lyric poetry. Cliché
is everywhere and nowhere. If cliché is one of the defining
characteristics of poetry, and particularly of lyric, then what are we
to make of it? This is not a question of what contemporary lyric
might be hiding “between the lines” per se—it is not a program for
interpretation. But as I aim to make demonstrate in the following
paragraphs, contemporary lyric poetry relies on cliché for its

It should be clear by now that the double-movement is also a double-bind. It
might even be more accurate to describe this double movement as a "doublybinding double-movement".
11
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legibility, and that that aesthetic choice has political consequences
that are ultimately political failures—be they expressions of or
catalysts towards such failure.
I want to make clear that I do not mourn the loss of genre
and in fact quite celebrate it, but my argument here is concerned with
poetry and its critics, and thus I feel the need to explicate upon and
justify to some reasonable degree what I mean by lyric and lyric
poetry, and how exactly it “repeats itself in a Deleuzean sense,” the
argument that quite obviously haunts this essay (What does the
“lyric” in “lyric poetry” denote?).
To start with a return: Derrida makes a significant distinction
between the poetic and the poematic. The relevant passage reads:
The poetic, let us say it, would be that which you desire to
learn, but from and of the other, thanks to the other, and
under dictation, by heart, imparare a memoria. Isn't that
already it, the poem, once a token is given, the advent * of an
event, at the moment in which the traversing of the road
named translation remains as improbable as an accident,
one which is all the same intensely dreamed of, required
there where what it promises always leaves something to be
desired? ...12

*

From Peggy Kamuf's translation: La venue: also “she who has come.”
Ibid.

12
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Here already Derrida gives us the jargon to distinguish between what
can be said (the poetic, which is the aesthetic—that is to say,
language or expressive form—of the poem) and what cannot, yet
desires to be said, and thus compels the imperfect utterance that
results from this process. This latter is what we might decipher as
the poematic impulse—the compulsion from within a poem that is
indeed hidden between the lines, but hidden so that it is
indecipherable. Such is the paradoxical dilemma of the poem, a
dilemma that Derrida likens to that of a hedgehog (l'hérisson) having
been thrown out onto an expressway. The tension between the
poetic and the poematic is the poem itself and is what compels
Derrida to urge us to learn poetry by heart (l'apprendre par couer/cours).
But on the subject of repetition (and with its relevance
towards criticism in mind), we must turn to the archive, at once
historical and affective, in order to compute anything that might
begin to resemble a critical response. Because the paradox of poetic
criticism is that it cannot escape the poematic impulse (and thus
becomes a discourse both about and within the poematic); and
because poetic criticism is precisely what conjures (something like) a
subjectivity, repetition becomes both the tool by which a poem can
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be deciphered (and therefore learned by heart) and indecipherable to
anyone or anything but itself.
An explication is in order. By "repetition" here I am
referencing the concept of repetition as explicated by Deleuze in
Difference and Repetition, in which repetition is argued to be the only
true form of difference, in some significant part because of its
iterability along both chronological and narrative time. 1314 Repetition
for lyric poetry functions by taking a set of available tools—the
language that the lines of the poem are written in—and arranging
them in a way that is simultaneously similar enough for our cultural
tastes and yet different enough from prose that we might recognize
it as poetry. In this way, it could be said that contemporary lyric
poetry is not quite so much suffering from exhaustion; it is simply
doing what each art form is designed to do—repeat itself across
different contexts throughout time. Perhaps that explains my
boredom with it. Without its line breaks, “lyric poetry” is simply
“prose poetry,” which is to say that contemporary lyric poetry is

Deleuze, Gilles. Difference and Repetition. Trans. Paul Patton. New York:
Columbia University Press, 1995.
14 My argument here—specifically the jargon on chronological time, narrative
time, denaturalization, and denarrativization are all taken from Fredric Jameson's
essay “Our Classicism” in The Ancients and the Postmoderns.
13
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romanticism (or, romantic language) for our times. In this way it is
determinately undifferentiated from prosaic language in that it shares
the same available set of expressions but arranges them in a way that
denaturalizes and denarrativizes the prosaic structure. Its aesthetic,
in other words, provides—at least for me—a silent but looming
discomfiture with being comforted by lyric. As Patricia Stuhlke has
recently demonstrated in The Ruse of Repair, art (and for that matter,
criticism) that comforts has the potential to make unethical life
justifiable. 1516
"Rhythmic dissymmetry" is the term Derrida uses in his
essay to name a trait by which a poem expresses its desire to be
learned by heart. And while I am partial to rhythm as a placeholder
for what I am calling repetition (i.e. the tendency of contemporary
lyric poetry to express a particular romanticism that I can't yet place),
it is worth keeping in mind that rhythm is something unique to
spoken language. French, for example, as an unaccented language,

Stuelke, Patricia. The Ruse of Repair: US Neoliberal Empire and the Turn from Critique.
Durham: Duke University Press, 2021.
16 For more on why an ethics of discomfort ought to guide our aesthetic
principles, I reference Adorno in Minima Moralia: Wrong life cannot be lived rightly. If
you'll take my recommendation, Matt Waggoner's Unhoused: Adorno and the Problem
of Dwelling explicates this problem well.
15
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relies—perhaps more so than the accented English—on idio-, topodialectic, and rhythmic cues so as to be intelligible.
The point I am trying to arrive at here is that contemporary
lyric poetry is particularly adept at effectualizing what Nietzsche—
and then Deleuze—called the Will to Power, largely in reference to
artistic production. It does this through what I am tempted to call,
thanks to Rebecca Mead, the Scourge of “Relatability”. 17 While
unsympathetic to Mead's rather conservative aesthetic values, the
concern I have is that "relatability" (en)traps us within the false
feeling of safety when we have instead been thrown—like
hedgehogs, like poems—into danger. Derrida reminds us that the
"gift" of the poem is a gift of subjectivity, albeit one that is instituted
within its own poetic and poematic order rather than one that
registers in vernacular prose:
A fable that you could recount as the gift of the poem, it is
an emblematic story: someone writes you, to you, of you, on
you. No, rather, a mark addressed to you, left and confided
with you, is accompanied by an injunction, in truth it is
instituted in this very order which, in its turn, constitutes
you, assigning your origin or giving rise to you... 18

17
18

Mead, Rebecca. “The Scourge of ‘Relatability.’” The New Yorker, 2014.
Ibid.
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With the myth of the stable subject utterly dismissed by contemporary
standards (and the subject itself even considered dead by some),
Derrida's hedgehog demonstrates the dilemma of the poem's
articulation, rendered in his language as “movement”:
But our poem does not hold still within names, nor even
within words. It is first of all thrown out on the roads and
in the fields, thing beyond languages, even if it sometimes
happens that it recalls itself in language, when it gathers itself
up, rolled up in a ball on itself, it is more threatened than ever in its
retreat: it thinks it is defending itself, and it loses itself. (Emphasis
added)19
It is perhaps here that I admit, and not in a footnote, that I have lost
myself to lyric before—who hasn't lost themselves to the music that
reminds them of themselves? But if what is needed of poetry—and
of critics—in our present times is not comfort but a constant critique
of the here and now, then what good is lyric and its critics?
I'm a post-aesthetician, and I'm over it.

_____________
Too much to say, and I don’t have the heart for it today.
— Jacques Derrida's opening words in his eulogy for
Gilles Deleuze

19

Ibid.

